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1.1  Introduction 
Future economic historians will undoubtedly stress trade liberalization 
as the most distinctive feature of  U.S. commercial policy over the past 
fifty years. As table  1.1 indicates, through a series of  thirty bilateral 
agreements and eight multilateral negotiations, tariffs have been steadily 
cut to only about 20 percent of their 1930 average level.' The increased 
use in recent years of  nontariff protective measures modifies this liber- 
alization picture somewhat, but the trend in protection over the period 
has clearly been downward. 
Although tariff reduction has been the dominant theme of U.S. trade 
policy since the early 1930s, important changes have taken place in the 
nature and extent of U.S.  support for this trade liberalization. A consid- 
eration of  these developments is helpful not only to better understand 
American  international  economic policy  over the period but  also to 
predict possible significant shifts in future U.S.  trade policy. To further 
these objectives, this paper focuses on five closely related trends in or 
features of U.S.  trade policy since the end of World War 11. They are: (1) 
the shift from the use of trade policy in the immediate postwar period as a 
means of  promoting broad international political and national security 
goals of  the United States to its greater use in recent years as a means of 
advancing national economic objectives  and responding  to domestic 
political pressures based on particular economic interests; (2) the con- 
tinuing efforts by Congress over the period to modify the trade powers of 
the president to make U.S.  international commercial policy more respon- 
sive to its wishes; (3) the changes in the positions of  the Republican and 
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5 Table 1.1  Duty Reductions since 1934 under the U.S. Trade Agreements Program 
Proportion of 
Dutiable Imports  Average  Average  Remaining Duties 
Subjected to  Cut in  Cut in  as a Proportion 
GATT Conference  Reductions  Reduced Tariffs  All Duties  of  1930 Tariffs" 
1. Pre-GATT,  63.9%  44.0%  33.2%  66.8% 
1934-47 
2.  First Round,  53.6  35.0  21.1  52.7 
Geneva, 1947 




4.  Third Round,  11.7  26.0  3.0  50.1 
5. Fourth Round,  16.0  15.6  3.5  48.9 
6.  Dillon Round,  20.0  12.0  2.4  47.7 
Geneva, 1961-62 
Geneva, 1964-67 
7. Kennedy Round,  79.2  45.5  36.0  30.5 
8. Tokyo Round,  n.a.  ma.  29.6  21.2 
1974-79 
SOURCE:  Real Phillipe Lavergne, The Political Economy of  U.S. Tariffs, Ph.D. thesis, University of  Toronto, 1981. 
"These percentages do not take account of  the effects of  either structural changes in trade or inflation on the average tariff level. 7  U.S. Trade Policy since World War I1 
Democratic parties  concerning the desirability of  trade liberalization 
versus increased protectionism; (4) the shifts in the attitudes of business, 
labor, and the farm sector toward the liberalization versus protectionism 
issue; and (5) the increased use of nontariff measures to regulate interna- 
tional trade at the same time that tariffs were being significantly reduced. 
Underlying the different shifts in postwar U.S. trade policy outlined 
above are three more basic economic and political influences that help 
explain  why  these  changes  occurred  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
affected the U.S. commitment toward a liberal trade policy. They are, 
first-and  most important-the  emergence and subsequent decline of the 
United  States as a hegemonic power; second, the persistent pressure 
exerted over the entire period by a politically significant group of domes- 
tic industries (whose composition changed somewhat over time) against 
trade liberalization and in favor of increased import protection for them- 
selves; and, third, the efforts by Congress to reduce the greatly increased 
powers  granted the president during the economic emergency of  the 
1930s and the military emergency of  World War 11. 
1.2  U.S. Leadership in Establishing a 
Liberal International Trading Regime 
Well before the end of World War 11, the foreign policy leaders of  the 
Democratic party had concluded that the lack of an open world economy 
during the 1930s was a major contributory cause of the warZ  and that the 
United States must, therefore, take the lead after the end of hostilities in 
establishing an open international trading system to make “the economic 
foundations of  peace . . . as secure as the political  foundation^."^ Thus, 
even before the war had ended, the Roosevelt administration had not 
only drafted a proposal for a multilateral trade organization but had also 
requested substantial, new, tariff-reducing powers from Congress. 
1.2.1  The Basis of  Democratic Support for a 
Liberal International Regime 
A desire on the part of political leaders for a new international regime 
is quite different from actually bringing about such a change, especially 
when-as  in this case-there  is a lack of  strong direct pressures for the 
change from either the country’s electorate or other governments. One 
factor that helped the Democratic leadership gain the support of  mem- 
bers of  their own party for the adoption of  a liberal international eco- 
nomic order was the compatibility of such a regime with the trade policy 
position  that the party had long supported. Since the late nineteenth 
century, the Democrats had associated high tariffs with monopoly profits 
for the rich and low tariffs with low prices for goods consumed by the 
average citizen? Furthermore,  they  maintained  that  low  U.S.  tariffs 8  Robert E. Baldwin 
encouraged low foreign tariffs and thus indirectly stimulated increases in 
U.S. exports, especially agricultural goods. This latter argument was 
crucial in obtaining passage of  the Trade Agreements Act of 1934.5 The 
gradual recovery  during the 1930s in employment and exports as the 
trade agreements program  was implemented served to reinforce  this 
ideological commitment of  Democrats to liberal trade policies. Conse- 
quently, the greater emphasis in the postwar period by the party lead- 
ership on the foreign policy merits of a liberal trade policy, in addition to 
its  domestic  benefits,  represented an extension of  the party’s  recent 
position that was not difficult for most Democrats to accept. It was also 
consistent with the stance adopted by the Wilson administration at the 
end of World War I. Thus, over 80 percent of  the Democrats voting in the 
House of  Representatives supported the party’s position on extending 
the trade agreements program during the 1940s and 1950s. 
The fact that implementing an open international trading system did 
not involve any significant new increase in the powers of the president 
also was important in gaining domestic support for the regime change. As 
a consequence of what almost all regarded as the excessive use of  logroll- 
ing during the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of  1930, coupled 
with the sense of crisis created by the depression that followed shortly 
thereafter, the Congress in 1934 gave the president the authority to lower 
U.S. tariffs by up to 50 percent in negotiations with other countries in 
return for reciprocal cuts in their import duties. Consequently, the 1945 
request for another 50 percent duty-cutting power to enable the United 
States to take a leadership role in international trade liberalization did 
not entail any basic changes in existing presidential powers. 
The most important reason, however, for the success of  the Democra- 
tic leadership in first gaining and then maintaining support for the U.S. 
leadership role in creating a liberal international economic regime was 
the  hegemonic  trade  and  payments  position  that  the  United  States 
assumed in the immediate postwar period!  The United States emerged 
from World War I1 with its economic base greatly expanded, while the 
economic structures of both its enemies  and industrial allies were in ruins. 
Except for Great Britain’s position at the outset of  the Industrial Rev- 
olution, economic dominance of  this extent is unique in the history of the 
industrial nations. Even as late as 1952, the U.S. share of total exports of 
the ten most important industrial countries was 35 percent whereas it had 
been only 26 and 28 percent in 1938 and 1928, respectively (see Baldwin 
1958). The 1952 U.S.  export share of manufactures was also 35 percent in 
contrast to only 21 percent in both 1938 and 1928. Furthermore, there 
was an export surplus in every major industrial group (e.g., machinery, 
vehicles,  chemicals, textiles, and miscellaneous  manufactures)  except 
metals. These abnormally favorable export opportunities, together with 
the vigorous postwar domestic economic recovery, served both to mask 9  U.S. Trade Policy since World War I1 
protectionist pressures from industries whose underlying comparative 
cost position  was deteriorating and to build support for liberal trade 
policies on the part  of  those sectors whose international competitive 
position was strong. 
The ability of government leaders to obtain domestic support for trade 
liberalization was further enhanced by the emergence of the cold war in 
the late 1940s. The public generally accepted the government view that 
the communist countries represented a serious economic and political 
threat to the United States, its allies, and the rest of the market-oriented 
economic world. The argument that the United States should mount a 
vigorous program to offset the communist threat by providing not only 
military aid to friendly nations but also assistance in the form of economic 
grants and lower U.S. tariffs, therefore, also received public support. 
There was still considerable opposition to trade liberalization in the 
immediate postwar period, however. As in the  1930s, a long list  of 
industries testified during the 1940s and 1950s against giving the president 
the power to cut duties on  imports competing with domestically produced 
goods. The products covered included textiles and apparel, coal, petro- 
leum, watches, bicycles, pottery and tiles, toys, cutlery, ball bearings, 
glass, cheese, lead and zinc, copper, leather, and umbrellas. The decision 
in this period not to apply a liberal trade policy to agriculture significantly 
weakened  the sectoral opposition to liberalization  and established  a 
precedent that has been used several times since to offset protectionist 
opposition. 
Pressures to halt further tariff cutting were also strengthened by  the 
opposition of many Republicans to liberalization on doctrinaire grounds. 
The Republican advocacy for protectionism  on the grounds that this 
policy promoted domestic economic development and high living stan- 
dards had an even longer tradition than the Democratic position in favor 
of  liberalization. 
From the outset of  the trade  agreements program,  the Roosevelt 
administration assured Congress that no duty cuts would be made that 
seriously injured any domestic industry. However, in 1945 the adminis- 
tration recognized the possibility that such injury might occur by agreeing 
to include in all future trade agreements an escape clause permitting the 
modification or  withdrawal of tariff reductions if increased imports result- 
ing from such a concession caused or threatened to cause serious injury to 
an industry.'  Furthermore, under prodding from Republican members of 
Congress, President Truman in  1947 issued an executive order estab- 
lishing formal procedures for escape clause actions whereby the Interna- 
tional Trade Commission (ITC) would advise the president whether such 
a modification was warranted. 
The strength of the early opposition to across-the-board liberalization 
is  further  illustrated by  the  history  of  the peril  point  provision  that 10  Robert E. Baldwin 
directed the president  to submit to the ITC a list of  all articles being 
considered for tariff negotiations and required the commission to deter- 
mine the limits to which each duty could be reduced without causing or 
threatening serious injury to import-competing domestic industries. This 
provision was introduced in the 1948 extension of the trade agreements 
program when both houses of Congress were controlled by the Republi- 
cans. It was repealed in 1949 when the Democrats regained control of  the 
Congress but  was  then reintroduced  in  the 1951 extension  act, even 
though the Democrats possessed a majority in both the House and the 
Senate. The escape clause was also made an explicit part of  the law at that 
time. 
These developments  indicate that the U.S. trade policy commitment at 
the beginning of the postwar period was to a policy of liberal trade rather 
than to a  policy  of  free trade. It was  recognized  at  the outset that 
protection of  particular industries would be permitted if  these sectors 
would otherwise be seriously injured by increased imports. Furthermore, 
as indicated by the provisions of  the charter for an International Trade 
Organization  (ITO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the commercial policy section of the ITO, pertaining to such 
practices as dumping and export subsidization, the United States as well 
as the other major trading nations condemned so-called unfair trade. 
The failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the IT0  or even to approve 
the GATT as an executive agreement is another indication of the early 
concerns  of  domestic  political  interests  for  import-sensitive  U.S. 
industries." Among other concerns, Congress was fearful that establishing 
a strong international  organization to deal with trade matters would lead 
to the destruction of  many U.S. industries as a result of increased im- 
ports. Numerous members of  Congress and some of  the groups they 
represented were also concerned about the increase in presidential power 
that the approval of  such an organization might involve. They believed 
that the division of political powers among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of  government had shifted excessively in favor of  the 
executive branch  as a result  of  the unusual problems  created by  the 
depression and World War I1 and were, consequently, reluctant to ex- 
tend  new  authority to the president, especially in an area specifically 
reserved for Congress under the Constitution. 
1.2.2 
As previously noted, the implementation  of the change from an in- 
ward-looking to an open international trading regime required the sup- 
port of other countries as well as of  the U.S. electorate. The hegemonic 
model is the major explanation put forth by political scientists to account 
for this support? The reasoning behind this model is as follows. 
Gaining International Support for a Liberal Regime 11  U.S. Trade Policy since World War  I1 
An open international trading (and payments) system has elements of a 
public good. For example, adopting a mercantilistic viewpoint, if  one 
country reduces its tariffs under the most-favored-nation principle, other 
countries benefit from the improved export opportunities this action 
creates even if  they do not make reciprocal duty cuts themselves. Conse- 
quently, any individual country has an incentive not to reduce its duties 
and to hope that it will benefit from the cuts made by other nations. This 
“free rider” problem may well result in the failure to secure a balanced, 
multilateral  set of  duty reductions even though they would benefit all 
participants. As Olson (1965) and other writers on collective goods have 
pointed out, it is less likely that the public good will be underproduced 
from a social viewpoint if  one member of  the concerned group is very 
large compared to the others. The dominant member is so large that the 
costs to it of free rides by other members tend to be small compared to its 
gains. Furthermore, the large member may be able to use its power to 
force smaller members to practice reciprocity. Thus, proponents of  the 
hegemonic theory of  regime change point to both the dominant trading 
position of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States 
in the immediate post-World  War I1 period to account for the creation of 
open world trading regimes in these periods. 
More specifically, in the immediate postwar period the United States 
was willing and able to bear most of  the costs of  establishing a liberal 
international economic order. The other major industrial countries were 
plagued by balance-of-payments problems, and they rationed their mea- 
ger supplies of  dollars to maximize their reconstruction efforts. Conse- 
quently, the tariff concessions they made in the early multilateral negotia- 
tions were not very meaningful in terms of increasing U.S. exports. U.S. 
negotiators were fully aware of this point, and they also offered greater 
tariff  concessions than they  received,  even on the basis of  the usual 
measures of  reciprocity (see Meyer 1978, p. 138). In effect, the United 
States redistributed  to other  countries  part  of  the economic surplus 
reaped from its usually favorable export opportunities to enable those 
countries to support the establishment of  an open trading regime. 
While the hegemonic model has considerable appeal, it  should be 
noted that just as U.S.  domestic support for an open trading system was 
qualified in several ways (e.g., no industry should be seriously injured by 
duty cuts), so too was the support of  other countries. For example, the 
British insisted upon a provision in the GATT permitting  the use of 
quantitative restrictions to safeguard a country’s balance-of-payments 
position. Furthermore, they were successful in preventing the complete 
elimination of imperial preferences and in excluding customs unions and 
free-trade areas from the nondiscriminatory provisions of  the GATT. 
Other illustrations of  the limited support of  GATT signatories for free 12  Robert E. Baldwin 
trade are the provisions permitting preferential government purchasing 
policies, allowing (at the insistence of  the United States) quantitative 
restrictions on primary products, and imposing almost no restraints on 
domestic subsidies. 
1.3  Shifts in Domestic Support for Liberalization 
The shifts in traditional party positions on trade policy that became 
evident in 1951, when the Democrats voted in favor of  the peril point 
provision and the escape clause, and when a surprisingly large proportion 
of  Senate Republicans supported the administration’s earlier efforts to 
establish a liberal world trading system, continued over the next thirty 
years. They were the consequence of  basic reassessments of  attitudes 
toward liberalization versus import protection by the various economic 
groups making up the two major political parties.  Congress also con- 
tinued to restrict the president’s ability to refuse to provide protection to 
industries judged by the ITC to be seriously injured by increased imports. 
At the same time,  however, Congress granted significant new  duty- 
cutting powers to the president. 
1.3.1  Political Parties and Income Groups 
When  the Republicans gained both  the presidency  and control of 
Congress in  1952, some Republicans expected a return to traditional 
protectionist  policies.  However,  President Eisenhower and  his main 
advisors within the administration and in Congress believed-like  earlier 
Democratic administrations-that  trade liberalization was an irpportant 
foreign  policy instrument  for strengthening the “free  world”  against 
communism. As became apparent with the issuance of  the report of  a 
commission established in 1953 by the president to study foreign trade 
(the Randall Report), Republican business leaders-especially  those in 
large corporations-also  had concluded that a liberal trading order was 
desirable from their own economic viewpoint. Thus, after a standoff 
period in 1953  and 1954 during which protectionist-oriented Republicans 
in the House blocked any further tariff cutting, the liberalization trend 
was renewed in 1955 when, with the help of  a Democratic Congress, 
President Eisenhower succeeded in obtaining a further 15 percent duty- 
cutting authority. In 1958 he was granted an additional 20 percent tariff- 
reducing authority. 
Just as more and more Republicans came to accept the desirability of a 
liberal trade policy as a general principle, more and more Democrats 
began to press for exceptions to this principle. In the late 1940s, the 
industries requesting import protection tended to be relatively small and 
not very influential politically. However, by the mid-1950s the politically 
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employees tended to vote Democratic, were asking for protection. In 
1955, the Eisenhower administration, as part of  its efforts to obtain the 
support of  the Democrats for its liberalization efforts, pressured the 
Japanese into voluntarily restricting their exports of cotton textiles to the 
United States. This did not fully satisfy the textile interests, however, and 
in 1962 President Kennedy agreed to negotiate an international agree- 
ment permitting quantitative import restrictions on cotton textiles as part 
of  his efforts to gain the support of  Southern Democrats from textile 
areas for the Trade Expansion Act of  1962.“‘ 
The coal and oil industries succeeded in obtaining a national security 
clause in the 1955 trade act that permitted quantitative import restrictions 
if  imports of  a product threatened “to impair” the national  security. 
Voluntary oil quotas were introduced on these grounds in 1958 and made 
mandatory in 1959. 
The most significant change in the nature of the support for protection- 
ism occurred in the late 1960s when the AFL-CIO abandoned its long- 
held belief in the desirability of  a liberal trade policy and supported a 
general quota bill. Basically, the shift in labor’s position was related to 
the rapid rise in import penetration ratios (and thus to the increase in 
competitive pressures) that occurred in many manufacturing sectors in 
the late 1960s. These included wool and man-made textiles and apparel, 
footwear, automobiles, steel, and electrical consumer goods, such as 
television sets, radios, and phonographs (see U.S. Congress, Committee 
on Ways and Means 1973). Workers also believed that large numbers of 
domestic jobs were being lost because of  extensive direct investment 
abroad by U.S. manufacturing firms. 
Still another reason for organized labor’s change in view was its dis- 
appointment with the manner in which the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA) program under the Trade Expansion Act of  1962 had operated. 
The AFL-CIO had supported passage of  this act in considerable part 
because its leaders believed that the extended unemployment benefits 
and retraining provisions of  the TAA program would greatly ease not 
only any adverse employment effects of  the Kennedy Round tariff cuts 
but also the job displacement effects of ongoing shifts in the structure of 
comparative advantage in the world economy. However, not a single 
decision providing adjustment assistance to workers was made under the 
program until November 1969. Congressional modifications in the ad- 
ministration’s original proposal on adjustment assistance that were not 
fully appreciated by labor or the Democratic leadership produced this 
unfortunate effect. As a result of  the program’s disappointing perform- 
ance, the AFL-CIO leadership became more and more disenchanted 
with a liberal trade policy, and in 1970 the organization testified in favor 
of  protectionist legislation. 
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reflected in the trade policy votes of  Democratic members of  Congress. 
In 1970 Wilbur Mills, the chairman of  the Ways and Means Committee 
and long  a strong supporter of  liberal trade policies, yielded to the 
pressures of many of the members of his committee and sponsored a bill 
establishing import quotas for textiles and footwear and requiring the 
president to accept affirmative  import relief decisions of the ITC  if certain 
conditions relating to the extent of import increases were fulfilled. In the 
House of  Representatives, 137 Democrats voted in favor of  the bill in 
contrast to only 82 against it. Republicans, on the other hand, opposed 
the bill 82 to 78. Further protectionist features, such as quotas on fresh, 
chilled, or frozen meats, were added in the Senate Finance Committee, 
but when the various trade provisions reached the Senate floor as an 
add-on to a social security benefits bill, the threat of a filibuster by a small 
group of Democratic senators who strongly supported liberal trade poli- 
cies forced recommittal of  the trade features of  the bill to the Finance 
Committee where they died. 
The shift in the positions of the two parties was again demonstrated in 
the voting pattern on the Trade Act of 1974,  which provided an additional 
60 percent duty-cutting authority to the president. In the final House 
vote, 121 Democrats voted against the bill whereas 112 supported it. 
Republicans favored the bill 160 to 19. Part of the increased Republican 
support can be attributed to the significant surplus of agricultural exports 
that began to emerge in  the early 1970s. The agricultural sector has 
become one of  the most internationally competitive parts of  the Amer- 
ican economy, and most farmers, who tend to support Republicans as 
members of  Congress, now press for trade liberalization as a means of 
reducing foreign trade barriers against their own export products. At the 
same time, however, because the international competitive position of 
certain large-scale industries, such as steel and automobiles, began to 
deteriorate (and continued to do so in the late 1970s and early 1980s), 
some Republican members of  Congress who rely heavily upon the sup- 
port of  big business began to adopt a more selective approach to liber- 
alization. 
It is doubtful, however, if  the Trade Act of  1974 would have been 
approved had not the president made certain concessions both to orga- 
nized labor and to particular industries subject to considerable import 
pressure.  The criteria for obtaining adjustment assistance were made 
much easier to meet labor’s objections, and the multilateral arrangement 
on textiles was extended to cover textile and apparel products manufac- 
tured from man-made material and wool as well as cotton. In addition, 
the voluntary export restraints agreed upon in 1968 by  Japanese and 
European steel producers were extended in the early 1970s. The shift to a 
flexible exchange rate system in 1971 was also an important factor en- 
abling the president to obtain new powers to reduce trade barriers. 15  U.S. Trade Policy since World War I1 
Although the pattern of congressional voting on trade policy measures 
in  the  early  1970s shows that  Republicans  favored  and  Democrats 
opposed liberalization, it is probably not correct to conclude that this 
represents a permanent shift in party positions. The fact that there was a 
Republican president at the time considerably influenced the nature of 
the voting by Republican and Democratic members of Congress. A more 
accurate description of  what has happened is that liberalization versus 
protectionism  is no longer a significant party position. The vote of  an 
individual member of Congress on trade policy is now more influenced by 
economic conditions in his district or state and by the pressures on him by 
the president (if they are both in the same party) rather than by his party 
affiliation. Regression analyses of  the voting patterns on the Trade Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of  1974 (Baldwin 1976, 1981) 
indicate that party affiliation was significant in 1962 but not in 1974. 
1.3.2  Congressional Restraints on the President 
From the outset of the trade agreements program, many members of 
Congress felt that  the president was too willing  to reduce tariffs in 
import-sensitive sectors and-along  with the ITC-too  reluctant to raise 
them for import-injured industries. Furthermore, they believed that the 
executive branch was not sufficiently “tough” in administering U.S. laws 
dealing  with  the  fairness  of  international  trading  practices.  Conse- 
quently, Congress frequently took the occasion of the program’s renewal 
to introduce provisions designed to force the president and the ITC to 
comply more closely with these congressional views. Much of  the pres- 
sure for these provisions came from import-sensitive domestic industries 
and labor groups. However, part of the readiness on the part of members 
of Congress to limit presidential authority on trade policy matters seemed 
to stem from a belief that Congress had given the president too much of 
its constitutional responsibility “to regulate commerce with foreign na- 
tions” and to levy import duties. 
Restricting the power of  the president by  introducing the peril point 
provision and a formal escape clause provision in 1951  has already been 
mentioned. The peril point provision was eliminated in the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of  1962, but the ITC was still charged with making a judgment 
“as to the probable economic effect of  modifications of  duties.” More 
important, at congressional insistence, the chairmanship of  the inter- 
agency committee established to recommend tariff cuts to the president 
was shifted from the State Department (long regarded by  Congress as 
being insufficiently sensitive to the import-injury problems of U.S.  indus- 
try) to a new agency, the Office of the United States Trade Representa- 
tive (USTR), which reports directly to the president.’’ The requirement 
of the 1974 law that an elaborate private advisory system be established 
has somewhat further restricted  the degree of  independence that the 16  Robert E. Baldwin 
president has in selecting items on which cuts are to be made and in 
determining  the  depth  of  those  cuts.  The creation  and  subsequent 
strengthening of congressional delegations to trade meetings and nego- 
tiations under the 1962 and 1974 laws have had the same effect. Since 
1954 the president has also been specifically directed not to decrease 
duties on any article if  he finds that doing so would threaten to impair the 
national security. Furthermore, in granting the president the authority in 
1974 to permit duty-free imports from developing countries, Congress 
specifically excluded certain articles, such as watches and footwear, from 
preferential tariff treatment. 
Congress  first put  pressure  on the president  to accept  affirmative 
recommendations of the ITC on escape clause cases when this provision 
was introduced into law in 1951 by requiring the president to submit an 
explanatory report to Congress if these recommendations were rejected. 
Since this seemed to have little effect on the president, Congress included 
a provision in the 1958 renewal act that enabled the president’s dis- 
approval of any affirmative ITC finding to be overridden by means of a 
two-thirds vote of both the House and Senate. This was eased in 1962  to a 
majority of  the authorized membership of  both houses and then in 1974 
to only a majority of  members present and voting.’’ 
Congress has also included  numerous provisions in the trade laws 
passed since the end of World War I1 aimed at increasing the proportion 
of  affirmative import-relief decisions on the part of  the ITC. The most 
obvious way  to accomplish this has  been  to change  the criteria for 
granting increases in protection when an industry is threatened with or is 
actually being seriously injured by increased imports. For example, the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of  1955 narrowed the definition of  an 
industry and required an affirmative decision as long as increased imports 
contributed  “substantially”  toward  causing serious injury.  The  1962 
trade act sharply reversed this move toward  easier  injury criteria as 
Congress apparently mistakenly believed that the new Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program would ease the pressures for import protection, but 
in 1974 the language was again changed to resemble closely what it had 
been in the 1955 law. Moreover, the requirement that the increased 
imports be related to a previously granted tariff concession was elimi- 
nated. 
Less obvious ways that Congress used in trying to make the ITC more 
responsive to its views were utilizing its confirmation powers to try to 
ensure that commission members were sympathetic to its views and 
changing certain  administrative  arrangements relating  to the agency. 
Beginning in the late 1960s,  the chairman of the Senate Finance Commit- 
tee, Senator Russell Long, and his committee colleagues began to argue 
forcefully that “it is to the Congress, not the Executive, that the Tariff 
Commission is expected to be re~ponsive,”~~  and they began to be very 17  U.S. Trade Policy since World War I1 
critical of  nominees whose professional background was largely in the 
executive branch of the federal government. In the period between 1953 
and 1967, five of  the thirteen commissioners appointed had extensive 
employment experience in the executive branch and another two in the 
commission itself. However, between 1968 and 1980, none of the twelve 
newly  appointed commissioners had either of  these backgrounds.  In- 
stead, seven of  the approved nominees had significant congressional 
experience, either as a member of  Congress (one person) or as congres- 
sional staffers. In a further effort to weaken the influence of the president 
over the  commission, Congress in  1974 removed  all controls  of  the 
executive branch over the commission’s budget and eliminated the power 
of the president to appoint the chairperson of the commission. This latter 
change was modified in 1977,  but the president still cannot appoint either 
of  his two most recent appointees as chairperson. 
Similar steps were taken by Congress to try to ensure a stricter enforce- 
ment of U.S.  trade laws relating to unfair foreign practices. For example, 
many members of  Congress long felt that the Treasury Department was 
too lax in administering U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty leg- 
islation. One step designed to change this was to transfer in  1954 the 
determination of injury (but not the determination of dumping) from the 
Treasury Department to the ITC. Furthermore, under pressure from 
Congress, the president in 1980 transferred the authority to determine 
both dumping and subsidization from the Treasury to the Commerce 
Department-an  agency that  Congress  believed would more  closely 
carry out its intent in these areas. The 1974 change in the manner of 
administering U.S. legislation pertaining to unfair import practices (sec. 
337 of  the Tariff Act of  1930) is another illustration of  the decline in 
presidential  authority over trade matters. Prior to 1974 the ITC con- 
ducted the investigations into alleged violations of  this law and then 
transmitted its findings to the president. If  the President was satisfied that 
unfair import methods had been established, he could ban the importa- 
tion of  the relevant products. However, in 1974 Congress gave the ITC 
the authority to ban imports of the affected products or to issue a cease 
and desist order to the person practicing the violation. The only power 
remaining with the president under this law is his ability to set aside the 
actions of  the ITC within sixty days “for policy reasons.” 
Perhaps the most significant reduction in the president’s authority over 
trade policy concerns his  ability to  negotiate agreements with  other 
countries covering nontariff measures. When Congress directed the pres- 
ident to seek such agreements under the Trade Act of  1974, it stipu- 
lated-unlike  it  has done with tariffs-that  any agreements must be 
approved by a majority vote in both the House and Senate. This provi- 
sion was extended in the Trade Agreements Act of  1979 and both gives 
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increases its control over the pattern of  tariff  cuts undertaken by  the 
president in a multilateral trade negotiation, since the tariff and nontariff 
concessions made by  the participants are closely linked. 
1.4  The Increasing Importance of 
Nontariff Trade-Distorting Measures 
As the reduction in tariffs by the industrial countries continued during 
the 1950s and 1960s, greater attention began to be given to nontariff 
trade-distorting measures, not only because they became more obvious 
as tariff rates declined, but also because there seemed to be a trend 
toward their greater use. During the 1960s, the extension in the use of 
quantitative restrictions from primary product sectors, such as agricul- 
ture and petroleum, to manufacturing activities, such as cotton textiles 
and steel; the greater utilization of  various export-rebate and import- 
deposit schemes to improve a country’s balance-of-payments position; 
and the introduction of many new domestic subsidies aimed at stimulat- 
ing growth in depressed areas, easing structural adjustments, and pro- 
moting high-technology industries, all served to direct attention to the 
fact that the benefits of tariff liberalization could be offset by nontariff 
trade barriers (NTBs). 
As the above illustrations indicate, the increased use of NTBs, particu- 
larly beginning in the 1960s, stemmed both from the efforts of particular 
sectors to secure protection or special export assistance through these 
measures  and  from  the  concerns  of  governments  with  balance-of- 
payments problems and with various social and economic policy objec- 
tives. In the case of the United States, for example, the sharp increase in 
the lending and guaranteeing authorizations of the Export-Import Bank 
in  the late 1960s and early  1970s and the approval of  the Domestic 
International Sales Corporation (DISC) in 1971 represented efforts to 
increase the country’s exports within the constraints of  the then fixed 
exchange rate system. While the United States also followed other in- 
dustrial nations during the 1960s in greatly expanding domestic programs 
directed at improving social and economic conditions for disadvantaged 
income groups and depressed sectors, most American programs had little 
direct or indirect effect on the pattern of trade. Such did not appear to be 
the case in a number of  other industrial countries, however. Substantial 
financial assistance by other governments to specific industries and par- 
ticular economic activities appeared to public and private officials in the 
United States to represent a serious threat to U.S. trade competitiveness 
and to the liberal international order in general. Consequently, wide- 
spread support began to develop for a new GATT-sponsored effort to 
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on others of such measures as a country’s domestic subsidies or its rules 
pertaining to product standards. 
U.S. officials did possess the authority to undertake negotiations on 
NTBs during the Kennedy Round of  trade negotiations, and a GA?T 
committee was established to deal with this subject. Agreement on an 
antidumping code was reached, as well as on eliminating a number of 
particular nontariff measures, such as the American selling price (ASP) 
system  of  customs  valuation  and  European  discriminatory  road-use 
taxes.  However, reaching agreement on tariff issues proved  to be so 
difficult and time-consuming that negotiations in the nontariff field were 
not very extensive. Moreover, Congress felt that the president had ex- 
ceeded his authority by trying to implement the new antidumping code as 
an executive agreement rather than submitting it to Congress for ap- 
proval and therefore passed a law directing the ITC to ignore the new 
code when making its injury determinations. Congress also rejected the 
proposal to eliminate ASP. 
In the markup sessions on the Trade Act of  1974, key members of the 
Senate were  adamant about the necessity of  submitting international 
agreements reached on nontariff matters to Congress for final approval, 
and, as noted earlier, such a requirement was included in the act. How- 
ever, once this matter was settled, Congress fully supported the efforts of 
the president to negotiate new NTB codes in the Tokyo Round, and the 
set of  codes eventually agreed upon was approved without difficulty by 
the Congress. 
At the same time efforts were undertaken to negotiate new agreements 
that would mitigate the adverse effects of foreign NTBs. U.S.  producers 
were pressuring government officials for stricter enforcement of existing 
U.S.  “fair trade” legislation, such as the antidumping and countervailing 
laws, and were seeking import protection under these laws to a greater 
extent than in the pastI4  Furthermore, domestic producers were demand- 
ing the greater use of quantitative restrictions (as compared with import 
duties) as the means of  protecting their industries against injurious im- 
port increases. 
One factor accounting for the greater number of  less-than-fair-value 
cases has been the difficulty of  obtaining protection through the tradi- 
tional  provisions pertaining  to injury caused by  import competition. 
Despite the 1974 easing of  the criteria for determining whether import 
relief should be granted, only forty-seven cases were decided by the ITC 
between 1975 and 1982, and in all but twenty-four of  these a negative 
decision was reached. Furthermore, the president rejected import pro- 
tection in all but ten of  the twenty-four cases. The likelihood that the 
routine acceptance of affirmative ITC decisions would be interpreted by 
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economic leadership role on the part of the United States appears to have 
made  the president  reluctant to accept more  than a relatively small 
proportion of  these decisions. Even the Congress has been hesitant on 
similar grounds to weaken the import-relief criteria much beyond what 
they were in the 1950s. 
Providing protection to offset alleged unfair trade practices is much less 
likely to be interpreted as representing a basic shift in policy, either by 
other governments or domestic interests supporting a liberal trading 
order. Thus, within reasonable bounds a president can support efforts to 
achieve “fair trade” through measures that protect domestic producers 
while still being regarded as a proponent of  liberal trade policies. 
Not only has a better understanding of  this point led domestic indus- 
tries to utilize U.S.  fair trade legislation more extensively in seeking 
import protection, but legislative and administrative changes relating to 
these laws have facilitated this shift. Congress, though diluting the presi- 
dent’s power to reduce trade barriers and to set aside ITC decisions, has 
at the same time given him new authority to limit imports on fairness 
grounds. For example, the 1922 and 1930 tariff acts granted the president 
the authority to impose new or additional duties on imports or even to 
exclude imports from countries that impose unreasonable regulations on 
U.S. products or discriminate against U.S. commerce. The 1962 Trade 
Act further directs the president to take all appropriate and feasible steps 
to eliminate “unjustifiable”  foreign import restrictions  (including the 
imposition of  duties and other import restrictions) and to suspend or 
withdraw previously granted concessions where other countries maintain 
trade restrictions that “substantially burden” U.S. commerce, engage in 
discriminating acts, or maintain unreasonable import restrictions. The 
Trade Act of  1974 restates these provisions and in section 301 also gives 
the president the authority to take similar actions in response to “sub- 
sidies (or other incentives having the effect of subsidies) on its [a foreign 
country’s] exports . . . to the United States or to other foreign markets 
which have the effect of  substantially reducing sales of  the competitive 
United States product or products in the United States or in foreign 
markets” and “unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on access to 
supplies of  food, raw materials, or manufactured or semimanufactured 
products which burden or restrict United States commerce.” However, 
Congress could veto any actions taken by the president. In amending this 
provision, the 1979 Trade Act stressed the president’s responsibility for 
enforcing U.S. rights under any trade agreement and simplified  the list of 
foreign practices against which he is directed to take action. Interestingly, 
this act also eliminated the authority of  Congress to nullify presidential 
actions taken under this provision by  a majority vote of  both houses 
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The extension of the definition of dumping in the Trade Act of  1974 to 
cover not only sales abroad at lower prices than charged at home but to 
include sales of  substantial quantities at below cost over an extended 
period (even if  domestic and foreign prices are the same) is another 
legislative change that encouraged the use of fair trade legislation to gain 
protection. Under this provision, the steel industry filed dumping charges 
in 1977 covering nearly $1 billion of  steel imports from Japan, all the 
major European producers, and India. However, as Finger, Hall, and 
Nelson (1982) point out, cases of this magnitude in key sectors attract so 
much political opposition (both domestic and foreign) that they cannot be 
disposed of  at a technical, bureaucratic level and consequently spill over 
into the political route for gaining import protection. In this instance, the 
domestic industry was successful in convincing President Carter that its 
claims were justified, and the so-called Trigger Price Mechanism for steel 
evolved as an alternative to pursuing the antidumping charges to the final 
stage. 
A similar political solution was reached in 1982  when the steel industry 
filed charges that European steel producers were receiving extensive 
subsidies and therefore should be subject to countervailing duties. The 
possibility of  countervailing duties had such significant economic and 
political implications that the governments of the parties involved did not 
wish the matter to be settled on technical grounds and sought a solution at 
the political level. Eventually the Europeans agreed to quantitative ex- 
port limits on a wide range of  steel products to the United States. 
Other important sectors that have been protected in recent years by 
nontariff  barriers  are the  footwear, television,  and  auto industries. 
Voluntary export restraints were negotiated by the president in the first 
two sectors after affirmative injury findings by the ITC. However, the 
ITC rejected the auto industry’s petition for import relief. Nevertheless, 
the industry was successful in persuading the administration of the need 
for import controls, and the Japanese eventually agreed to restrict their 
sales of  cars to the United States. 
The increased use of nontariff trade-distorting measures obviously has 
weakened the liberal international trading regime, not simply because 
they represent a move toward protectionism, but because many of them 
have been applied in a discriminatory manner and are negotiated outside 
of the GATT framework. Some of the political decisions reached at the 
presidential  level have also occurred without  the opportunity for  all 
interested parties to be heard, as would be the case if  a technical route 
such as an import-injury petition before the ITC were being followed, or 
even if  a political route at the congressional level were being pursued. 
Several of the most important nontariff measures utilized by the U.S. 
government  to restrain  imports or promote  exports are analyzed in 22  Robert E. Baldwin 
greater detail in other chapters of this volume. Their purpose is not only 
to explain more fully how these measures operate but also to appraise 
their effects on trade and economic welfare. 
1.5  Declining U.S. Hegemony  and the Liberal 
International Economic Order 
The hegemonic model of  regime change predicts openness in world 
trading arrangements when a hegemonic state is in its ascendancy and a 
shift toward a closed system as this nation declines in power and is not 
replaced by another dominant state. Although this theory is consistent 
with the early part of  the postwar period, there is general agreement 
(Krasner 1976; Goldstein 1981; and Lipson 1982) that the model does not 
perform very well as an explanation of  regime change for more recent 
years. 
Most writers (e.g., Whitman 1975;  Kindleberger 1981) date the decline 
in America as beginning in the 1960s. The decline in relative economic 
power is evident, for example, from the fact that the U.S.  share of 
merchandise exports of  the fifteen largest industrial countries fell from 
25.2 percent in 1960 to 20.5 percent in 1970, and then to 18.3 percent in 
1979.'5 The percentages for exports of manufactures for the same years 
are 22.8, 18.4, and 15.5. The U.S. share of  the GNP of  these countries 
was 57.1 percent in 1960,50.2  percent in 1970, and only 38.1 percent in 
1979. It became quite clear during the long and difficult Kennedy Round 
negotiations concerning the appropriate tariff-cutting rule to adopt that 
other industrial countries, especially the European Community, were no 
longer prepared  to continue to accept  the U.S.  leadership role in  a 
routine manner.'6 As the reduction in cold war tensions during the 1970s 
reduced  the perceived  need  for  U.S.  military protection  against the 
Soviet Union, the decline in American economic and political influence 
became even more evident. 
Despite a shift in power from a situation where one country dominated 
the economic scene to one where there are now three major economic 
blocs (the United States, the European Community, and Japan), most 
observers agree that the trade and payments regime continues to be 
essentially an open and liberal one. As table 1.1 shows, the tariff cuts 
made in the 1960s and 1970s were actually much deeper than those made 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Furthermore, the new nontariff codes negotiated 
during the Tokyo Round, though often very general in their wording, do 
represent a significant accomplishment in providing the basis for prevent- 
ing nontariff measures from undermining the liberalization benefits from 
the postwar tariff cuts. While the GAm  ministerial meeting in Novem- 
ber 1982 again demonstrated the inability of  the United States to domi- 
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the continued commitment of  the major industrial nations to a liberal 
international  economic  order.  The increased  use  of  nontariff  trade- 
distorting measures described in the last section represents derogation 
from this order, but the trading regime still remains essentially an open 
one. 
A consideration of  either the economic theory of  market behavior or 
the production of collective goods suggests that the failure of  the hege- 
monic model to predict the continuation of an open system should not be 
surprising. A single firm that dominates a particular market is likely to 
stabilize the price  of  the product  at  a monopolistic level while  still 
tolerating some price cutting by the smaller firms making up the rest of 
the industry. However,  oligopolistic market theory suggests that the 
same result is likely if  two or three large firms dominate an industry. 
Similarly, as Olson (1965) pointed out, the free-rider problem associated 
with collective action by an industry can be overcome if a small number of 
firms (as well as just one firm) produce a significant share of the industry’s 
output. Thus, the continued support for a stable, open trading order as 
the distribution of  power changed from an almost monopolistic situation 
to an oligopolistic one is quite consistent with market behavior theory. 
The  shift from a hegemonic position to one in which the country shares 
its previous economic and political power with a small number of  other 
nations is, however, likely to alter the country’s international behavior 
somewhat, just as the change in the status of a firm from a monopolist to 
an oligopolist is likely to change the firm’s market behavior. In the U.S. 
case, the nature of  the change has been to initiate trade negotiations 
mainly to achieve economic benefits for the country rather than to further 
general U.S. foreign policy and national security goals.” This shift in 
emphasis first became apparent in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of 
negotiations when government leaders stressed to the public the eco- 
nomic gains that would be achieved by lowering the European Commu- 
nity’s tariff level and thereby reducing the trade diversion resulting from 
the formation of this customs union. The usual arguments about the need 
to strengthen the free world as a means of  meeting the threat of commu- 
nist expansion were also presented, but with less vigor than in the past. 
Support for a multilateral trade negotiation based on the view that it 
was in the economic interests of the United States to participate in such a 
negotiation was even more evident in the Tokyo Round. In early 1973 
President Nixon sent a generally worded bill to Congress that provided 
the president with the authority to modify tariffs as he thought appropri- 
ate and to conclude agreements with other nations on nontariff issues. 
Congress took the opportunity of a proposed negotiation to reshape the 
bill so that it dealt with many of  its concerns about the nature of  the 
international trading system. In doing so, it soon became apparent that 
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increasing use of  nontariff measures by  other countries would signifi- 
cantly curtail U.S. export opportunities and lead to injurious increases in 
imports. Congress reacted in part by strengthening U.S. fair trade legisla- 
tion, but its main response was to give the president detailed directions 
about negotiating new international codes aimed at reduced nontariff 
trade-distorting measures. In other words, both the Congress and the 
president agreed that strengthening the liberal international economic 
order was in the economic interests of the United States, quite aside from 
its political and national security implications. 
As might be expected, the less altruistic behavior on the part of  the 
United States in its international economic relations has resulted in an 
increased number of trade disputes between the United States and other 
Many who support a liberal trading order are concerned that 
these disputes will become so  numerous and difficult to solve that the 
system will collapse with each of  the major trading powers pursuing 
inward-looking trade policies. This is, of course, a possibility. However, 
most of the trading frictions do not arise because of disagreements on the 
principles involved in the commitment to an open trading system but on 
matters of interpretation within these principles. For example, as pointed 
out earlier, the key parties in the system have always agreed that it was 
proper to shield an industry from injurious increases in imports. Conse- 
quently, when the United States protects the auto and steel industries 
from import  competition or the Europeans subsidize industries as a 
means of  retaining their domestic market shares, this is not regarded by 
most countries as a departure from the basic liberal trading rules. Dis- 
agreements sometimes arise, however, over whether a country is going 
beyond the intent of  the rules and engaging in what in effect are beg- 
gar-thy-neighbor policies. The settlement of  major disputes at a high 
political level and the continuing efforts to improve the GATT dispute- 
settlement mechanism are a recognition by the major trading nations of 
the damage to the system that could occur from such disagreements. 
Krasner (1976) argues in his amendment to the hegemonic model that 
the abandonment of the commitment to a liberal trading order on the part 
of  the United States (or the other major trading nations) is likely to occur 
only when some major external crisis forces policy leaders to pursue a 
dramatic new policy initiative that they believe to be in their country’s 
interests. However, it may be that the existing power-sharing arrange- 
ment between the United States, the European Community, and Japan 
reduces the likelihood of this outcome compared to the case of  a declining 
hegemony in the midst of many smaller states. In this latter situation, the 
dominant power is tempted in a crisis to take advantage of its monopoly 
power over the terms of trade. But when power is shared, the recognition 
both that a country’s market power is quite limited and that retaliation is 
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greater concern than the possibility of  a dramatic abandonment of  the 
liberal international economic order is the likelihood of  a continuing 
gradual erosion in the openness of  international trade because of  the 
inability of  the major industrial powers to agree on international mea- 
sures that take into account the economic interrelationships between 
trade policies and policies in the exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, and 
social areas. 
Notes 
1. If the effects of structural  shifts in trade and of  inflation on  specific duties are included 
along with the negotiated tariff cuts, the average tariff on  dutiable imports drops from a 1931 
level of  53 percent to about 5 percent  after completion of  the Tokyo Round cuts. 
2. Gardner (1980, p. 9) documents this point and describes the planning activities of the 
administration for the postwar period. 
3. Statement by President  Roosevelt to Congress on 26 March  1945. 
4.  Hull  (1948, vol.  1, p. 81) and Dobson (1976, pp.  5666) describe the traditional 
Democratic and Republican positions on trade policy. 
5. See Wilkinson (1960, chaps. 1 and 5) for an elaboration of  this point as well as a 
discussion of the subsequent postwar shift in emphasis toward foreign policy considerations. 
6. Authors who developed this explanation for the postwar establishment of  a liberal 
international economic order under U.S. leadership include Kindleberger  (1973, 1981), 
Gilpin (1975), and Krasner (1976). 
7.  See Leddy and Norwood (1963) for a detailed discussion of the escape clause as well as 
the peril point provisions. 
8.  Diebold  (1952) analyzes the reasons why the IT0  failed to gain U.S. support. 
9. See Lipson (1982) for a succinct statement and analysis of  the hegemonic model. 
10. For a description of the protectionist pressures from the cotton textile industry as 
well as the oil and coal industries during the 1950s and early 1960s, see Bauer, Pool, and 
Dexter (1963, chap. 25). 
11. In response to complaints from Congress and the private sector concerning the lack 
of  a unified U.S. trade policy strategy, President Reagan in the spring of  1983 proposed 
merging USTR and parts of the Commerce Department into a new Department of  Interna- 
tional Trade and Industry. 
12. The June 1983 Supreme Court decision  declaring the congressional veto  to be 
unconstitutional presumably means that this provision will no longer apply. 
13. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 23 June 1971. In these hearings, 
Senator Long explained the actions of  the committee  during the late 1960s on various 
presidential nominees to the commission. 
14. Between 1955 and 1972, the average number of antidumping reports issued by the 
ITC averaged less than six per year, whereas this rate increased to thirteen between 1974 
and 1979. Similarly, the number of countervailing duty investigations completed by the ITC 
between 1962 and 1973  was twelve, while the number rose to  thirty-seven between 1974 and 
the end of  1978. 
15. These and the following figures are from the Office oi'Foreign Economic Research, 
U.S. Department of Labor (1980, chap. 3). 
16. This was due in part to  the fact that the United States was no longer willing to provide 
the necessary  compensation  to these  other countries  to gain their acceptance  of  U.S. 
proposals. 26  Robert E. Baldwin 
17.  Krasner (1979) also makes this point. 
18. Cooper (1973) discusses the increase in trade disputes after the mid-1960s and the 
implications for foreign policy. 
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Comment  Richard N. Cooper 
Robert Baldwin has given us a masterly summary of  the evolution of 
postwar U.S. trade policy and the forces that have shaped it. I have little 
quarrel with what he has said. I can perhaps contribute more by making 
some general observations on trade policy, designed to complement and 
extend Baldwin’s paper. 
Liberal trade policy is a triumph of  pure reason over common sense. 
Everyone who is not an economist thinks he knows that imports reduce 
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profits and limit jobs. This view is even attributed, perhaps apocryphally, 
to President Abraham Lincoln. It is conceded that noncompeting prod- 
ucts such as coffee and bananas increase consumer variety, and that 
competing products may lower prices. But in a work-oriented society 
based on the Protestant work ethic, jobs are more important than con- 
sumption. In any case, what good are lower prices if  people have no 
income to spend? 
Much trade is in the form of inputs into the industrial process, such as 
steel which goes into the production  of  automobiles and  household 
appliances, and industrial buyers might be expected to press actively for 
lower tariffs on these inputs. To some extent they do, as is reflected in the 
escalation of  tariffs by stage of  processing. But this pressure for lower 
tariffs on industrial materials is inhibited by the business ethic, which is 
not to criticize or contradict other businessmen openly. Representatives 
of  business often are extraordinarily quiet on issues of public policy that 
do not affect them visibly. Opposition takes the form of  nonsupport. 
Economists know that all this represents partial equilibrium thinking, 
and that in a general equilibrium framework imports need not reduce 
profits  or eliminate jobs  in  the absence  of  special features, such as 
downwardly rigid factor prices. But the world of ordinary perception is a 
partial equilibrium world. General equilibrium is an intellectual  con- 
struct imposed on the normal senses and comprehension of  how things 
actually work. 
Despite this, as Baldwin shows, we have had a major move toward 
more liberal trade over the past half century. Why is this so? It partly 
represents the strength of ideas over perception. Men of  affairs have a 
vague recollection of learning in college that international trade is a good 
thing, at least in the long run. The details are forgotten, but the argument 
seemed compelling at the time and is not easily abandoned. 
But the move toward liberal trade is mainly the result of history and of 
foreign policy. High tariffs are associated with the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, and indeed the Hawley-Smoot tariffs were a major contribut- 
ing factor to the depression. Furthermore, the then secretary of  state, 
Cordell Hull, thought that tariffs, and especially tariff discrimination, led 
to war. He worked single-mindedly to build a postwar system of  low, 
nondiscriminatory tariffs. 
This political motivation for liberal trade was reinforced by the neces- 
sity to rebuild Europe following World War 11, a task which, it was early 
realized, could best be accomplished on a multilateral basis rather than 
by each nation acting on its own. Thus trade liberalization became a 
major feature of  postwar foreign economic policy both within Europe 
and between the United States and Europe, and a major plank of overall 
foreign policy. 
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considerations with respect to trade policy. In the early 1960s it insisted 
that negotiations on tariffs be removed from the Department of State and 
moved to a newly created special trade representative in the executive 
office of the president. More recently, we have seen strong congressional 
sentiment for creating a new Department of  lnternational Trade and 
Industry, on the model of  Japan’s Ministry of  International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), to absorb the function of  trade negotiations and give 
them a more clearly commercial orientation.  But from a presidential 
perspective, an ultimate unity exists between national security and for- 
eign economic policy because our principal allies are so heavily depen- 
dent on foreign trade for their economic well-being, and hence for their 
security. Maintenance of  a liberal trade policy by  the United States is 
national security policy in the broadest sense. 
The Roosevelt administration during the Great Depression was able to 
begin the process of  trade liberalization by  introducing the notion  of 
reciprocity: the reduction of  US. import tariffs was necessary to per- 
suade foreigners to reduce their import tariffs,  and that  in  turn was 
necessary to stimulate U.S.  exports, which in turn created jobs. Without 
reciprocity, trade liberalization almost certainly could not have occurred, 
despite the persistent argument by  well-trained economists that even 
unilateral trade liberalization  is good for the country undertaking it. 
Economists have introduced two qualifications to this argument for uni- 
lateral tariff reduction. The first concerns the terms of trade; if  a country 
reduces its tariffs unilaterally, the resulting worsening of its own terms of 
trade may more than offset the efficiency gains resulting from the tariff 
reduction. Reciprocal tariff reductions could avoid this worsening of the 
terms of trade. (The argument in any case does not apply to a country so 
small that it cannot influence its terms of trade.) The second qualification 
concerns adjustment costs. A country that unilaterally reduces its tariffs 
may worsen its balance of  payments and have to take demand-deflating 
corrective action to deal with it. Thus a cost is imposed on the country 
that unilaterally reduces its tariffs. Again, reciprocal reductions in tariffs 
can avoid this temporary deterioration in the balance of payments, or at 
least reduce it to a second-order effect. 
But if  we are realistic observers of  the political scene, we economists 
must recognize that neither of these arguments were responsible for the 
success of  reciprocity. Rather, the motivation was primarily mercantilis- 
tic. The public was persuaded that tariff reductions would increase ex- 
ports at least as much as competitive imports, and this in turn would 
create profits and employment. 
The advocates of  liberal trade have managed to secure the semantic 
high ground in the debate. No one wants to be a “protectionist” these 
days. It is a bad word. (It was not always so. In the 1920s and even in the 
late 1940s some politicians were avowedly protectionists.) This is perhaps 30  Robert E. Baldwin 
one favorable consequence of years of teaching results that were complex 
to absorb in detail, but whose general flavor got through. As a result, 
those who favor protectionist policies must dress in the semantic clothing 
of liberal traders. They argue for “fair trade,” and now especially they 
are pushing for true “reciprocity” in trading relationships, a phrase that 
has been associated for the last fifty years with the liberalization of trade, 
not with protectionism. But many draft pieces of  legislation and other 
proposals that are dressed in the guise of innocuous terms or even terms 
with favorable connotations are protectionist  underneath. Economists 
are remiss by not looking at these proposals in detail and by leaving the 
field to lawyers. Perhaps the current proposals for protectionist action 
can be beaten back one by one, each defeated on the dubiousness of its 
merits. 
But in trade policy, as in other areas of life, the best defense is to take 
the offensive. Protectionist trade legislation is unlikely to be enacted if 
the United States is actively engaged in trade negotiations with other 
countries, or  even in preparing for such negotiations. Liberal trade policy 
has been likened to a bicycle: one must continue to move forward to 
avoid falling over. The partial equilibrium perceptions will dominate 
policy unless the executive branch can stay in motion, keeping the  foreign 
policy aspects of trade policy as well as the nation’s economic interests in 
the forefront. This general wisdom does not automatically dictate the 
next policy moves, however, since tariff reductions have already pro- 
ceeded very far. The next logical step in that direction would be free trade 
in industrial products. U.S. Trade Representative Brock’s emphasis on 
liberalization of trade in services can be interpreted as a move to take the 
offensive. The same can be true of the current administration’s initiatives 
in agriculture, although that is treacherous territory and could lead to a 
morass rather than to clear forward movement. 
The liberal trading system is in peril  at present  (late  1982). High 
unemployment and a strong dollar, leading to a large trade deficit, both 
contribute to the strong protectionist pressures. Both are consequences 
of the tight monetary policy that was introduced to fight inflation. Para- 
doxically, the major casualty in this fight against inflation may be the 
liberal trading system-a  possibility that did not enter the calculations 
either of  monetarists or of  central bankers. 
COmmeIlt  Alfred Reifman 
Baldwin’s paper on the changing nature of U.S. trade policy is an excel- 
lent and thoughtful appraisal. However, despite the well-advertised de- 
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cline in  U.S.  hegemony, the  United  States remains  the single most 
important economy in the world and the only country that can take a 
constructive initiative: 
The European Community is not a country, though it has some of the 
attributes of one. Despite the Treaty of  Rome, important economic 
decisions require unanimity. This obviously is a brake on its potential 
leadership role. 
Japan ought to be a leader in world economic affairs since it has a 
large and persistent balance-of-payments surplus and a much higher 
rate of  economic growth than the other industrial countries. But it 
shows no signs of  moving to the head of  the parade. 
In short, the United States must continue to lead, though it will need 
to elicit the cooperation of the European Community and Japan. 
The reciprocity legislation in the Congress is in part an attempt to get 
the attention of Japan and the European Community on trade questions 
and not necessarily a retreat to protectionism. 
As today’s issues in international trade move from measures taken at 
the border (tariffs and quota restrictions) to domestic policies reflecting 
the increased  role  of  government in the economy (industrial  policy, 
state-owned  enterprises,  domestic  subsidies,  regulation  of  industry, 
etc.), the universal rules of GATT (nondiscrimination and reduced bar- 
riers at the border) become inapplicable or, if  not, more difficult to apply. 
This, as much as the decline in U.S. hegemony, raises serious problems 
for GATT. 
Baldwin notes that U.S. trade policy is shifting its objective from broad 
political and security goals to economic or mercantilist ones. This is 
certainly correct. But he does not ask how much of the shift is temporary 
because of  (a) slow growth, (b) the stage of  the business cycle, (c) the 
overvalued exchange rate, and (d) the growth of  interdependence. 
The economic profession can be credited for making liberal trade the 
basic objective of  the U.S. bureaucracy in both Republican and Demo- 
cratic administrations and making protectionism the deviant behavior. 
Finally, the appointment of Cordell Hull as FDR’s secretary of  state 
was a lucky accident. Hull, a Southerner, firmly believed that free trade 
was good economics-a  Southern tradition-and  important for peace. 
Thus the reciprocal trade program became his prime interest over the 
other subjects a secretary of state normally has on the top of his agenda. This Page Intentionally Left Blank